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Introduction 
 
 
The Circassian Question 
Russian Colonial History in the Caucasus and a Case of “Long-distance Nationalism” 
Uwe Halbach 
On 21 May 2014 Circassians all over the world marked the 150th anniversary of the 
expulsion of their ancestors from their North Caucasian homeland. The links between 
this unresolved legacy of Russian colonial history and President Putin’s prestigious 
Winter Olympics in Sochi have reinvigorated Circassian activism. While different 
objectives and methods coexist within the movement, the demand for acknowledge-
ment of the wrongs inflicted on their forebears is shared by both the remaining Cir-
cassian population in the North Caucasus and Russia (about 700,000) and the world-
wide diaspora (several million). What challenges does this present for Russia? 
 
Sochi 2014 confronted the world with 
the hitherto largely neglected “Circassian 
question”. Although the Olympic city and 
its North Caucasian neighbourhood had 
been the Circassians’ historical homeland 
until 1864, the host nation neglected to 
include them in the planning of the Games. 
This contrasts, for example, with the Cana-
dian approach to its indigenous population 
for the previous Games in Vancouver. When 
President Vladimir Putin presented Sochi’s 
bid in 2007, his speech to the IOC men-
tioned numerous nations and cultures that 
had shaped the Caucasian Black Sea coast 
since classical antiquity, but not the Cir-
cassians. The first time he spoke of the 
original inhabitants of the area was shortly 
before the Games opened, to complain 
that forces hostile to Russia were exploiting 
the “Circassian card”. By contrast, the par-
liaments of the republics of Kabardino-Bal-
karia (1992) and Adygea (1996) used the 
term “genocide” in resolutions on historic 
violence against the Circassians. What they 
were referring to was the deliberate expul-
sion of what was then the largest North 
Caucasian nationality, following its 1864 
defeat in the Russian-Circassian War. 
Emergence of a National Movement 
The choice of Sochi reignited a Circassian 
movement that had emerged in the early 
1990s but subsequently lost momentum. 
The most significant development in the 
early post-Soviet period occurred between 
August 1992 and September 1993, when 
the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia 
erupted into open warfare. This brought 
forth a solidarity movement, the Confedera-
tion of the Peoples of the Caucasus, which mobi-
lised large parts of the North Caucasus, 
 Dr. Uwe Halbach is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division. SWP Comments 37 
 This paper is a product of the EC funded FP7 project “Intra- and Inter-Societal Sources of Instability in the Caucasus and August 2014 
 EU Opportunities to Respond”. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission. 
1 
 especially the residual Circassian popula-
tion, to fight against Georgian forces in 
Abkhazia, and played no small role in their 
defeat. Hundreds of Circassian volunteers 
joined the fighting. The remaining Cir-
cassian population in the North Caucasus 
lives largely in the republics of Adygea 
(capital: Maykop), Karachay-Cherkessia 
(Cherkessk) and Kabardino-Balkaria (Nal-
chik). Kabardino-Balkaria has the highest 
proportion of Circassians (Kabardians) in 
its population, with 55 percent. During the 
post-Soviet phase Circassians in all three 
republics competed with representatives 
of other nationalities for local political 
and economic resources, for example with 
Turkic Karachays and Balkars and with 
ethnic Russians. The 1999 presidential 
elections in Karachay-Cherkessia repre-
sented an ethno-political watershed, fol-
lowed by weeks of demonstrations against 
the disputed victory of the Karachay can-
didate. Yet another spur for a Circassian 
national movement came in 2005, when 
the Kremlin announced plans to revoke 
Adygea’s autonomy and merge it into Kras-
nodar Krai. The central demands of the 
activists are for Circassians in the North 
Caucasus diaspora to be permitted to 
return, and for the historical Circassian 
settlement areas to be amalgamated into 
a single autonomous territorial unit. 
The Diaspora 
The mobilisation that began in 2007 
reached well beyond the North Caucasus, 
into the worldwide diaspora in which 90 
percent of Circassians live today. The largest 
community is in Turkey, as the successor to 
the Ottoman Empire to which most of the 
Circassian deportees were sent. In Turkish, 
“Çerkes” is often used to describe all groups 
with Caucasian roots in modern Turkey, 
amounting to a figure of several million. 
As far as Circassians in the stricter sense 
are concerned, the Ottoman authorities re-
settled the deportees of 1864 among Arme-
nians and other minorities in western and 
central Anatolia and in Ottoman posses-
sions in the Balkans and the Middle East. 
Although figures for groups of Caucasian 
origin in modern Turkey are based on 
estimates, it is known that there are more 
people of North Caucasian, especially Cir-
cassian and Abkhazian, origin in today’s 
Turkey than in their original home regions. 
Although several hundred Circassian 
villages can still be found in central and 
western Anatolia, as a whole homogenous 
diaspora settlements of single Caucasian 
nationalities in generally dissolved in the 
course of urbanisation. In the post-Soviet 
period the large Caucasian diaspora came 
to play a role in Ankara’s relations with 
Russia and the South Caucasus. When the 
Abkhazia conflict flared up, organisations 
in Turkey called for support and solidarity 
for the struggle of their Abkhaz “brothers” 
and the volunteer forces from the North 
Caucasus. Later Chechnya became a point 
of reference for Caucasian solidarity groups. 
The Chechen wars fell in a period of warm-
ing relations between Russia and Turkey 
that saw the two Black Sea powers – which 
fought more than a dozen wars in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – 
growing closer in the fields of business, 
energy and tourism. This placed narrow 
limits on Ankara’s solidarity with diaspora 
groups agitating against Russia. The same 
also applies to relations with Georgia, 
which also blossomed in the spheres of 
commerce and tourism.  
Circassian diaspora groups are also of 
some relevance in Middle Eastern states 
and societies. Up to 100,000 North Cau-
casians are estimated to live in Jordan, 
largely Circassians, but also Chechens and 
others. Here the Circassian minority is 
especially strongly rooted in government, 
business and the military and close to the 
royal family. The Circassian community in 
Syria, which also numbers about 100,000, 
is currently endangered by the civil war. 
Circassians in Egypt occupy a special his-
torical position. They arrived there not 
through deportation from Russia in the 
nineteenth century, but as Mamluks, a 
military caste that played a leading role 
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 in Egypt from the fourteenth century. The 
Circassian community in Israel comprises 
only about 3,500 members, but stands out 
for its homogenous settlements and preser-
vation of the native tongue. The younger 
generation of the Western diaspora (for 
example in the United States and Germany), 
on the other hand, generally no longer 
speaks Circassian. Islam has not to date 
been central to national identity, though 
young Circassians in the North Caucasus, 
like their peers in other Muslim nationali-
ties there, have come under the influence 
of radical Islamist networks. In Kabardino-
Balkaria, for example, the group Yarmouk 
has emerged as a jihadist formation. It is 
the memory of the 1864 deportations that 
is central to Circassian identity. 
Return to the Homeland? 
In the early 1990s Russian Caucasian 
republics with residual Circassian popula-
tions established ties to the diaspora and 
supported returnee programmes. But aside 
from a few thousand returnees the contact 
remained largely restricted to tourism by 
diaspora Circassians in the historic home-
land. Nor was a broader returnee move-
ment to be expected, given that Circassian 
immigrants in many places have been 
relatively well integrated for several gen-
erations. The current exception is Syria, 
where the escalating civil war represents 
an acute threat to ethnic and confessional 
minorities. Circassian organisations world-
wide are now calling upon Russia, which 
in 1999 gave refuge to Circassian families 
from the war zone in Kosovo, to accept 
Syrian Circassian “returnees”. While several 
hundred have already arrived in Maykop 
and Nalchik, Moscow is generally wary of 
returnee movements of non-Russian nation-
alities in the North Caucasus. The Russian 
leadership has no interest in immigration 
increasing the Caucasian population in the 
region, after most of the ethnic Russians 
left during the course of the past twenty 
years. The Ukraine crisis has heightened 
contradictions in Russian immigration 
policy. After annexing the Crimea, the 
Kremlin offered all citizens of the former 
Soviet Union Russian citizenship as long 
as they were able to speak Russian. The 
language restriction naturally excludes 
diaspora Circassians. At the same time, 
Russian-speakers from eastern Ukraine 
are currently being resettled in the North 
Caucasus, despite concerns about the secu-
rity situation there. 
International Networking 
The first International Circassian Congress was 
held in Nalchik in May 1991. It set up the 
International Circassian Association (ICA), whose 
elected members represent Circassian com-
munities in the three north-west Caucasian 
republics and the diaspora. They comprise 
numerous organisations from Turkey, 
Russia and other countries, including Cir-
cassian councils (Adyghe khase) from the three 
North Caucasian republics, from Krasnodar 
Krai, from Moscow and from Abkhazia, 
charities from Turkey, the Middle East, 
California and New Jersey, and a Tscher-
kessische Kulturverein (Circassian Cultural 
Association) from Germany. 
The ICA sees its main task as coordinat-
ing cultural relations between Circassian 
communities across the world. It has, how-
ever, not pursued that goal with great 
vigour. Its offices are staffed largely with 
members of the bureaucratic elites of the 
three Caucasian republics, who were con-
cerned to avoid confrontation with Moscow 
and practically failed to respond to Russian 
repression against activists who raised the 
“Circassian question” in connection with 
Sochi 2014. Such activists increasingly 
organise in small autonomous groups out-
side the ICA, which also missed the tran-
sition to the internet age and for a long 
time did not even have its own website. 
Shifting Relations with Abkhazia 
and Georgia 
In 1992 Circassians joined other North 
Caucasian nationalities to fight with the 
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 Abkhaz, their ethnic kin in the South 
Caucasus, against Georgia. But allegiances 
shifted after the Russo-Georgian Five-Day 
War of 2008. Under President Mikheil 
Saakashvili, Georgia pursued an anti-
Russian North Caucasus policy, one of 
whose central elements was to stir up the 
Circassian question in connection with 
Sochi 2014. In May 2011 the Georgian par-
liament passed a resolution recognising 
the “genocide of the Russian Empire against 
the Circassian people”. Tbilisi was thus able 
to drive a wedge between Abkhazians and 
Circassians, who had both once suffered 
so-called ethnic cleansing under Russian 
colonialism. Its great dependency on Russia 
in its conflict with Georgia meant that Ab-
khazia was, to the frustration of its former 
ally, unable to join these recognition moves. 
The new Georgian government in 2012 
adopted a more pragmatic line towards 
Russia and thus also North Caucasus and 
refrained from boycotting the Olympic 
Games in Sochi. But its underlying stance 
on the Circassian question remained un-
changed. In the aftermath of the 2014 
Crimea crisis, some political forces in 
Ukraine are now calling for Russian colo-
nial policy towards the Circassians to be 
officially condemned as “genocide”. 
Outlook 
Today there are few veterans from the time 
of the Abkhazia war left among the ranks of 
Circassian activists. A new generation aged 
between 18 and 28 communicates via the 
internet and is networked with Circassian 
communities across the world. They pro-
vide an example of the phenomenon for 
which the American political scientist 
Benedict Anderson coined the term “long-
distance nationalism”, which has already 
been identified in the Armenian and other 
diaspora communities. Although the Cir-
cassian case has not produced a coherent, 
militant or overtly returnee-driven national 
movement liable to burden the problem-
laden North Caucasus with yet more poten-
tially violent conflict, the revival of interest 
in their ethnic roots among young people 
of Circassian origin does represent a chal-
lenge for Russia. Moscow finds itself con-
fronted with an unresolved chapter of its 
colonial history – during a phase where 
President Putin is cultivating a patriotism 
that leaves little space for self-critical his-
torical reflection. 
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